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ABSTRACT  
Information security is an area that IS researchers can and should contribute to (Zafar and Clark, 2009), including 
password related research (Kreider, 2018; Kreider and Rao, 2010).  One common attack against password entry, the 
shoulder surfing attack, occurs when an attacker unknowingly observes a user while entering their password (Tari et al., 
2006), which has been shown to be a feasible attack using the Microsoft Hololens augmented reality wearable.  While the 
attack was shown to be feasible, no countermeasures were explored.  This paper will explore potential countermeasure to 
the shoulder surfing attack presented by Kreider (2018).  The countermeasures will be explored both from an efficacy 
perspective, as well as a usability perspective.   While other studies exploring this phenomena focus on the importance of 
discreet input, such as a haptic sensor (Roesner et al., 2014) and gesture control armbands utilizing electromyography 
(Zhang et al., 2017), our study will explore mechanisms not requiring discreetness.   
The shoulder surfing attacks identified by Kreider (2018) take advantage of the fact that the users selection of the characters in 
the Microsoft Hololens augmented reality wearable are easily observable.  Specifically, the user must move their head to center 
the cursor on the character in the AR keyboard, and “air tap” within the purview of the front facing characters to select each 
character.  Finally, once completed, the user selects “close keyboard” key on the AR keyboard, which is always located in the 
same location relative to the keyboard.  While an observer cannot see the keyboard the user is viewing, they can observe the 
user during entry, and reverse the path the head takes when selecting the characters, starting at the “close keyboard” character. 
To counter this ability to reverse the course taken to identify the characters selected, we have identified three potential counter 
measures: keyboard randomization, keyboard jitter, and keyboard warping.  Keyboard randomization will alter the location of 
keys within the keyboard after each character is selected, and has been explored by (Zhang et al. 2017).  Keyboard jitter will 
alter the location of the keyboard as a whole randomly in the AR space after each character is selected.  Finally, keyboard 
warping will alter the way in which the keyboard is presented so that it is not a perfect rectangle, but instead, is randomly 
changed in shape for each password entry.  Each of these is designed to alter the keyboards arrangement and/or location within 
the AR space viewable by the user.  For each of these counter measures, we seek to explore how efficient they are disabling 
the shoulder surfing attack described above, while also exploring the usability of such countermeasures from the users 
perspective.  Finally, we will explore how difficult each countermeasure would be to implement.  
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